On July 14, 1866 Stumpf met Franz Brentano for the first time during the disputation of his habilitation at the University of Würzburg. This meeting was crucial for the young musician who, in his memoirs on Brentano, said he was impressed by the elegant manner with which Brentano argued for and defended his thesis (Stumpf 1924, 391). According to Brentano’s main thesis, “the true method of philosophy is nothing other than that of the natural sciences” (Stumpf 1922, 70). It prescribes the use of the inductive method in philosophy and it convinced several of his students that the future of philosophy could be something quite different from what was taught at that time in the departments of philosophy in Europe. This is certainly the impression that Brentano’s disputatio left with Stumpf, and this encouraged him to attend Brentano’s lectures in the fall semester and to abandon his studies in law to undertake studies in philosophy. Thus, during the period from 1867 to 1870, Stumpf attended Brentano’s lectures on metaphysics, Comte’s positivism, logic, and the history of philosophy. However, since Brentano was no longer authorized to supervise theses, he recommended that Stumpf, and later Anton Marty, move to Göttingen to study with Hermann Lotze. Between 1867 and 1868, Stumpf studied mainly psychology, the history of philosophy up to Kant, the philosophy of nature, and practical philosophy, and attended the lectures of the physiologist G. Meißner and the physician W. Weber. After his promotion in August 1868 with a dissertation on Plato (1869), Stumpf returned to Würzburg to study with Brentano. In 1869, Stumpf entered the ecclesiastical seminary in Würzburg but resigned shortly after due to the influence of Brentano and Lotze (Stumpf 1924, 393-94; 1919, 22ff). He returned to Göttingen in 1870 to prepare his habilitation on mathematical axioms (1870) under the supervision of Lotze and defended it successfully in October of the same year. He became, at the age of 22, lecturer at the University of Göttingen and a colleague of Lotze. During the three years he spent in Göttingen as Dozent, he undertook his first extensive research on the history of the concept of substance and then abandoned it shortly after to begin, in 1872, a study on space perception (Stumpf 1924, 395). This study resulted in an important book, Über den Ursprung der psychologischen Raumvorstellung, which appeared in the fall of 1873 and placed Stumpf in a position to replace Brentano in Würzburg,
who had recently left to accept a professorship in Vienna. Stumpf was appointed professor at Würzburg in 1873 at the age 25. This date marks the beginning of a long academic career that lasted nearly fifty years in prestigious universities such as Prague, Halle, Munich, and Berlin, where Stumpf accomplished a great amount institutionally, philosophically, and scientifically (see Fisette 2008, 2007, 2006).

In his inaugural address at the University of Berlin in 1895, Stumpf compared the influences that Brentano and Lotze had on him during his years of study in Würzburg and Göttingen, at a time when speculative systems were declining and an empirical orientation was increasingly favored:

“Franz Brentano has guided me in this direction and has provided me, through his keen knowledge and scholarship of Aristotle, with decisive and detailed suggestions as well as the seeds of several ideas, while the later influence of Lotze lies, in particular, in his conveying to me his interest in psychological objects and their broader use.” (Stumpf 1895, 735)

Although his studies in Würzburg under Brentano were relatively short compared to those under Lotze in Göttingen, the seed of most of his philosophical ideas had its origins in the former. This is not to say that Lotze, whose influence on philosophy in the nineteenth century was crucial both in Germany and in England, was not a source of inspiration for Stumpf, as testifies his paper published in the Kantstudien on the occasion of the centenary of Lotze’s birth (Stumpf 1917; see Lotze 2003). Although Brentano’s recommendation to Stumpf to pursue his studies with Lotze certainly influenced Stumpf’s decision, Lotze’s scientific approach in philosophy was another factor, as confirmed by this passage from Stumpf’s memoirs:

“None among the German professors of philosophy can equal him [Lotze] in considering, as does Brentano himself, that the method of thinking in the natural sciences and close contact with the natural sciences are essential for philosophy and a prerequisite for its efficient practice.” (Stumpf 1917, 2)

The lesson that Stumpf learned from the philosophy of Lotze has less to do with his plan to renew Kantianism than with his approach toward philosophy and the importance he gave to the natural sciences in his work in physiological psychology, which was instrumental in the development of the new psychology during the second half of the nineteenth century. The philosophy of Lotze is also considered the antithesis of idealistic systems and a model to follow in the quest for a true “renaissance of philosophy” (Stumpf 1907, 165). Stumpf’s debt to the

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1 Brentano was appointed professor at the University of Vienna in 1874 and occupied the chair of history and theory of inductive sciences until 1880. He nevertheless continued to teach there with the status of Privatdozent until the appointment of Mach in the same chair in 1895, a year after the university had refused him his own psychology laboratory. See Brentano (1895, 37) for a more detailed discussion.
psychology of Lotze is also evident in his *Raumbuch*, which is dedicated to the latter. The general framework of this book is the controversy between nativism and empiricism as presented by Helmholtz (1910 vol. 3, § 25) in his *Handbuch*; his point of departure is Lotze’s *Medizinische Psychology* (Lotze 1852), more specifically his theory of local signs, which represents his main contribution to the problem of the origin of space perception and which influenced Helmholtz and Wundt. Stumpf accepts Lotze’s theory only as a physiological theory and conditionally to the abandonment of the idea of mental stimulation essential to the theory of Lotze (see Stumpf 1873, 149; 1893). The position he defended in his *Raumbuch* is, in fact, the psychological counterpart of the physiological nativism of E. Hering, and it relies on the idea of “psychological part,” which plays a key role in most of his works up to *Erkenntnislehre* (see Stumpf 1924, 425). Yet, as Stumpf explains in the book, he acquired this idea through his research on the history of the concept of substance; the position he defends in this book owes largely to Brentano (Stumpf 1939, 183, note 24), even though the knowledge he gained in the field of scientific psychology and the interest he took in discussions on space perception were certainly acquired during his stay in Göttingen.

Although Lotze is a privileged interlocutor in several writings of Stumpf, especially in his 1928 book on affects and sense-feelings, his first inspiration in philosophy is undoubtedly Franz Brentano. In his “Reminiscences of Franz Brentano,” Stumpf explains straightforwardly his debt to the latter’s philosophy:

“My whole understanding of philosophy—the correct and mistaken methods of philosophizing, the basic and essential doctrines of logic, the theory of knowledge, psychology, ethics, and metaphysics—and which I still maintain today, are his doctrines.” (Stumpf 1919, 43; see 1924, 27 f)

Stumpf’s debt to Brentano and his philosophy is well documented in his writings published during his lifetime and in many manuscripts. The most important document for our study is the rich and abundant correspondence that Stumpf and Brentano exchanged until the latter’s death in 1917 (Brentano, 1989). This correspondence shows the close relationship between the two philosophers on a personal level and it demonstrates how much Brentano’s judgment on philosophical and scientific issues has authority over Stumpf and his other pupils. But it also shows that on some issues, including emotions, as we will see later, they were divided. Stumpf also published three papers of a biographical nature on Brentano and his school, the most important being “Reminiscences of Franz Brentano” (Stumpf 1919, 1920, 1922). These texts also provide an outline of Brentano’s general program in philosophy and some remarks on how it was received by his students. Clearly standing out from these remarks is that even Meinong and Husserl, for example, who deviated considerably from the training they received from Brentano in Vienna, were still considered full members of the school of Brentano because of their deep roots in this program.
It also explains the “family resemblances” among Brentano’s students, such as A. Marty, with whom Stumpf maintained a close relationship both personally and philosophically until his death in 1914. This applies a fortiori to the work of Stumpf in philosophy as testified in the second part of Stumpf’s autobiography, in which he outlines his own work until 1924 and claims at the outset that it reflects “the initial inspiration received from Brentano” (Stumpf 1924, 413). Finally, we note that two of his most important books are dedicated to Brentano: the first is the second volume of Tonpsychologie; the second is Erkenntnislehre, published posthumously in honor of the 100th anniversary of Brentano’s birth.

Stumpf’s Brentano, as we said, is the Würzburger from whom he had been taught, although Stumpf had access to several of Brentano’s later manuscripts on psychology and logic, as well his 1885/86 lectures on psychology and aesthetics (see Schuhmann 1996; Stumpf 1918, 25) and of course his works published after that period. However, judging by their correspondence, we can see that compared to the original program, the two philosophers took different paths and deviated on several important points. As Stumpf explains in his autobiography:

“My deviations from Brentano’s theories were the result of an internal, constant mental development. The pupils of Brentano naturally have many things in common in consequence of the same starting-point; many others, however, because of the necessity of changes, additions, and continuations simultaneously felt by those who proceed in the same direction.” (Stumpf 1925, 415)

Although he does not explain in this passage what exactly these deviations are, we have several other sources that are explicit about the disputes that gave rise to controversies between the student and his mentor. The most important source is a preface to his correspondence with Brentano that he prepared in 1929 for publication but which was never published (Stumpf in Brentano 1989, XXI ff). However, part of this preface is reproduced in the edition of Brentano’s letters to Stumpf, in which he recounts some of his memorable feuds with Brentano, namely an attack against him, in three letters dated from February 1903, which he finally destroyed because of their content (Stumpf in Brentano 1989, XXIII). Philosophically, the controversy that gave rise to the publication of Stumpf’s paper “Über den Begriff der Gemüthsbewegung” (in Stumpf 1928) is certainly the most instructive as to the differences between the two philosophers. In a letter dated 18 August 1899, Brentano acknowledged receipt of this article and blamed Stumpf in a bitter tone for his deviations from the original doctrine, and suggested, as wrote Stumpf in his preface, “that I seemed to be a dissident for him” (Stumpf in Brentano 1989, XXII). Stumpf explains that the content of this letter reflects a widespread attitude of Brentano towards the writings of his students, an attitude that Stumpf criticizes in a passage of his “Reminiscences,” in which he comments on Brentano’s relationship with his students:
"It is very awkward to have to refer to lectures or even conversations in order to explain to the reader the assumptions one uses as a starting point; it is even more awkward to attack points of view which came from your teacher and which you can no longer share, if these points of view are not available in printed form. [...] I admit that this was one of my motives for devoting a considerable amount of time to the area of the psychology of sound and acoustical observation. There I could hope to achieve something useful without taking a position of agreement or dissent with regard to a great number of unpublished views of the teacher. It was the same with Marty in philosophy of language and Kraus in philosophy of law." (Stumpf 1919, 43-44)

Hence, Stumpf knew in 1899 that by addressing the topic of emotions in this article without ever mentioning the work of Brentano on so central an issue, he faced criticism, which is indeed what happened. There followed a long controversy in the correspondence and in a series of published papers, which lasted until Brentano’s death in 1917. Failing a detailed account of this complex polemic, I will only emphasize the aspects of the discussion that bring to light Stumpf’s deviations from Brentano’s program.

**Stumpf and Brentano on Affects and Sense-Feelings**

The starting point of this controversy is the distinction proposed by Stumpf (1899) between emotions (joy, envy, disgust, etc.) and what he calls *Gefühlempfindung* (pain, pleasure, etc.), which can be translated as sense-feeling or “algedonic sensation” (Stumpf 1928, 68). Stumpf argues that there is a specific difference between sense-feelings, which are sensory qualities such as sound and color, and emotions, which are intentional states directed towards objects. The issue is whether the pleasure provided by an object, say a work of art, is intentional, as it is in Brentano’s doctrine in which it is closely related to the class of affects, or phenomena, as argued Stumpf and the sensualists James and Mach. It is this issue that divided Brentano and Stumpf.

In a lengthy letter dated 18 August 1899 (1989, 115 ff), Brentano acknowledges receipt of Stumpf’s paper and reproached him for departing from the original doctrine on several points, including a lack of criteria for the classification that Brentano outlines in the letter in terms of intentional inexistence, and an abandonment of the three-category classification in favor of a classification with only two categories, namely intellectual functions (perception, representation, and judgment) and affective functions (emotions, desire, and will). Brentano also questions the validity of the distinction, borrowed from Lotze, between passive affects, to which belong the emotions, and active affects, which are primarily desire and will. Above all, Brentano blames Stumpf for ignoring his own doctrine regarding affects. Although Brentano conceives of affects as complex states of the soul, he also believes that there are emotional states such
as pleasure and displeasure, aesthetic enjoyment, etc., that do not belong to the class of affects but which are nevertheless intentional states. They therefore do not involve judgment, states of affairs, or any other conceptual activity, as is the case for emotions. Finally, their positions differ on sensations, including the issue of intensity and fusion.

Stumpf responded to Brentano in a letter dated early September of the same year, in which he seeks to minimize his dispute with Brentano by remaining in agreement with the broad lines of the original doctrine and with most of the objections raised by Brentano in his letter. Seven years later, in a letter dated 12 June 1906, Stumpf announces the publication of a talk he gave in Würzburg on the theme of sense-feelings (Gefühlempfindungen) and claims that he argues therein for a position he attributes to Brentano regarding sensualism, according to which sense-feelings belong to a class of sensation. He refers here to his article published in 1907 under the title “On sense-feelings,” in which he mentions, in fact, his agreement with Brentano’s position on the basis of a conversation he had with him on that issue (Stumpf 1928, 57). In this paper, Stumpf identifies three distinct theories of emotional feelings, and argues that Brentano, like himself, defends the third theory, which he formulates in the following passage:

“The so-called sensory feelings or feeling tones of sensation are themselves sensations of sense. Therefore, they belong neither to the functional part of consciousness, but to the objective, nor to the functions, but to the material, when one counts colors, sounds, smells as objects and materials of consciousness, and in the same sense in which one does.” (Stumpf 1928, 93)

But such is not the position of Brentano, as confirmed in their correspondence and a long footnote to his paper “The psychological analysis of sound qualities in their first elements” (Brentano 1907, 93 ff). Brentano outlines his dispute with Stumpf in five points (Brentano 1907, 237), two of which are the most important for our purposes. The first point describes pleasure and pain as affects and therefore intentional mental phenomena with the same structure as judgments and affects. The second point raises an important aspect of their dispute over the nature of sensations and their relation to acts or mental functions. Brentano refers once again to his doctrine of primary and secondary objects (1907, 239) as developed in his Psychology (1874, 176 ff), with the difference that he now distinguishes sensations that are affects from those which, like auditory and visual sensations, are not (see Brentano 1911). This does not imply that the visual and auditory senses do not trigger emotions, for that would exclude eo ipso musical and pictorial enjoyment. Nevertheless, these sensations are not affects belonging to the third class of acts; rather, they belong to what Brentano calls concomitant sensations.
Almost ten years passed before Stumpf responded to Brentano’s objections. In 1916, he published the paper “Apology of sense-feelings” in which he responded to the objections of several psychologists and philosophers, including Brentano. In this paper, he now recognized his major disagreements with Brentano not only on sense-feelings, but also on several other fundamental aspects of Brentano’s psychology. He admits to having misunderstood Brentano’s doctrine in his 1907 article in which he associates it with the third theory. In fact, it is clear from this discussion that Brentano’s position on sense-feelings corresponds to the second theory in which sense-feelings are another kind of mental state in addition to sensations and fall under the concept of Mitempfindungen. This, according to Stumpf, is Brentano’s final position on the issue (Stumpf 1928, 109).

In a final letter dated 30 July 1916 (Brentano 1989, 150 ff) Brentano provides new details of their dispute while indicating two other aspects of psychology that are at stake in this debate. Brentano acknowledges receipt of “Apology” and again accuses Stumpf of failing to understand certain principles of his doctrine and not taking into account his research in the field of sensations. Brentano reminds him once again of the importance of distinguishing between primary and secondary objects and points out two other aspects of their dispute. The first, introduced after the publication of his Psychology, is the distinction between sensations that are affects and those, such as seeing and hearing, which are not. The second point concerns another important aspect of the debate—whether the question of internal perception, which actually belongs to the field of knowledge theory, can legitimately be raised in psychology, as it is by Brentano when he says that the existence of pleasure and displeasure is guaranteed by the self-evidence of inner perception. Brentano wondered if Stumpf was disputing the authority of internal perception in the field of psychology.

The final piece to this already complex puzzle is Stumpf’s substantial introduction to his book Affect and Sense-Feeling, in which his three main papers on emotions are reproduced in whole. Our main interest in this introduction is Stumpf’s classification of acts, which he again opposes to Brentano’s. In his two treatises of the Academy of 1906, Stumpf clearly delineates descriptive psychology understood in the narrow sense as the science of mental functions both from phenomenology as a science of sensory phenomena and from the theory of knowledge that studies issues relating to the origin and justification of knowledge. This topic of the relation between sense-feelings, i.e. phenomena belonging to the field of phenomenology, and affects, understood as higher order functions belonging to the field of psychology, raises two further issues: first, the relationship between the field of phenomena and that of mental functions that Brentano conceives of in terms of presentation; second, the hierarchical relation between elementary and complex functions. Brentano’s solution is the well-known thesis according to which every act either is a presentation or is founded on a presentation. But
this principle, as argues Husserl in his *Logical Investigations*, cannot be taken for
granted because of the ambiguity of the term “presentation,” which refers both to
the quality of an act (the mode of presentational relation of consciousness to its
object) and to its content (not to be confused with the object of the act). Stumpf
and Husserl agree with Brentano that there is a relation of foundation between
acts of lower and higher levels, but they propose to make two significant changes
to the original thesis. The first concerns the structure of acts and the criticism of
the immanent theory of intentionality that Brentano develops in his *Psychology*
of 1874. Stumpf claims that content is a formation (*Gebilde*) that is specific to every
class of acts, such as judgment, whose formation is a state of affairs, and that these
are comparable to Bolzano’s *Sätze an sich*. However, we know that Brentano was
always strongly opposed to this kind of objectivism defended not only by Stumpf
and Husserl, but also by Meinong and Marty (see Fisette & Fréchette 2007). The
second significant modification concerns Brentano’s representationalism, which
consists in founding all classes of functions, including the class of presentations,
on sense perception. As Stumpf explains in his article of 1907, the revision
he proposes to Brentano’s original classification is motivated primarily by his
research on sense perception (Stumpf 1928, 95), which he considers a more
primitive function than the acts of presentation in Brentano’s classification. In its
broadest sense, perception is understood as *Bemerken von etwas* (Stumpf 1906a,
16); perception is to first order phenomena what the class of presentations in
Brentano’s sense is to second order phenomena. This last distinction has a direct
bearing on their dispute in that sense-feelings belong to first order phenomena
while presentations belong to second order phenomena, i.e. “mnemonic images”
and phenomena such as color or sound as they are “merely represented” (see
Stumpf 1918). Brentano claims that there is a specific difference between sensory
phenomena and presentations, and the difference that may exist between
the intensity of a sound and its mere presentation in the imagination is not a
difference of degree between phenomenal content and presentational content but
a difference that has its origin in the act of presenting itself.

The revision proposed by Stumpf has consequences on several of Brentano’s other
central theses, such as the judicative character of perception, the asymmetry
between internal and external perception (and between physical and mental
phenomena), concomitant sensations understood as intentional states, and the
document of primary and secondary objects. We will complete our review of
this controversy with some remarks regarding Stumpf’s criticism of Brentano’s
document of primary and secondary objects, which, as R. Chisholm pointed out
in his introduction to his edition of Brentano’s *Sinnespsychologie*, is one of the
most important aspects of their dispute regarding pleasure and emotions. As we
pointed out earlier, this theory is clearly stated in Brentano’s *Psychology* of 1874,
and as we saw, it was referred to on several occasions in the correspondence and
in the footnote of 1907. Any sensory perception, any act of sensation, according to Brentano, has a primary object, such as sounds or colors, and a secondary object, which is the very act of seeing colors or hearing sounds.

“The former is something sensitive and qualitative, whereas the second is the act sensing itself to which always relates (bezieht) the act of sensing both in the mode of representation and in that of recognition in the self-evident judgment, and sometimes also in the mode of emotion [emotionell]; in the latter case, it is given through the sensation of pleasure and pain, and this explains and whether the conduct in question to feel, as a real affect, is different [to other].” (Brentano 1907, 237)

To use Stumpf’s metaphor, this theory of primary and secondary objects places the sensory quality in a double bracket and it is therefore doubly indirect: it places it first in the act sensing, that is to say in the act of representation that subsumes seeing and hearing, and therefore feeling and what is felt; it then places it in a second set of brackets, namely in a higher level act such as an act of love and hate which are associated to pleasure and displeasure (see Stumpf 1928, 109). Stumpf’s understanding of Brentano’s theory can be schematized as follows: Emotion [Representing (represented)]. This amounts to identifying the pleasure (primary object) and the act of feeling the pleasure (secondary object), since in Brentano’s third class of acts, they are the same. Brentano’s main argument in favor of this identification is based again on the idea that “pleasure and pain, like seeing and hearing, are guaranteed [verbürgt] by the self-evidence of internal perception” (Brentano, 1907, p. 237), contrary to primary objects whose existence is merely intentional. It follows that for Brentano, there is absolutely no pleasure to sensory phenomena as such, but only to acts of seeing, hearing, etc., so that pleasure and displeasure always fall under the concept of functions-feelings or what Utitz called Funktionsfreude (Stumpf 1928, p. X). Stumpf argues instead that pleasure and displeasure draw their origin from the realm of phenomenology and that they represent a necessary condition to affects.

Stumpf provides two arguments against Brentano’s theory. One is based on the classical case of localization applied to sense-feelings. We may ask a patient to locate her pain by asking her whether she suffers in her arm, head, or another part of her body, and in most cases, she will answer without effort. However, we cannot ask her to locate her anger or sadness. Yet, space as intensity is an attribute of tactile and visual phenomena, not of functions, and it follows that pleasure and pain are phenomena just as color is, for example, and we cannot talk in this case about a specific difference between the first and second order contents, that is, between presentation and sensation, as Brentano does. Stumpf’s second argument is formulated in another article, which discusses Brentano in one of his last letters (Stumpf 1916). It is based on the pathological case of a musician suffering from anhedonia, a marked inability to feel pleasure while listening to music (or
participating in any other activity previously experienced as pleasant) without one’s auditory sense being significantly affected. Stumpf argues that an anhedonia to musical notes would result in a kind of apathy or loss of emotion or enjoyment to music in general. An accomplished musician may well experience an aesthetic sentiment simply in reading a musical score, but without sense-feeling, he could not enjoy it as intensely. Hence, sense-feelings are essential to the formation of aesthetic feelings, and there is a difference, no less essential for Stumpf, between merely representing or remembering a musical piece and experiencing it directly. However, unlike sensualism, Stumpf considers that sense-feelings alone are not a sufficient condition for aesthetic enjoyment; it requires, in addition, that the source of pleasure become the subject of an intentional act, and so of emotions. Hence the idea that aesthetic enjoyment, like emotions in general, have two distinct sources: the first is sense-feelings, lying in what Stumpf calls the fullness of formal relations that inhabit a work of art and its parts; the second concerns the relationship of the act to its object or to its properties, specifically to the presented state of affairs (Stumpf 1928, 9; 1924, 438).

Conclusion
In his book *Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie und Theodizee*, G. Katkov, a student of Kraus in Prague, argues that Stumpf’s criticism in the polemic is perhaps “the most important reaction of modern psychology to Brentano’s positions.” (Katkov 1937, 94-950). However, despite the bearing of this criticism on several aspects of the philosophy of Brentano, including ethics and value theory, this controversy has all the airs of a family feud since the main parameters of Brentano’s program remain intact. What is at issue, as we have seen, is primarily Stumpf’s own phenomenology and the special relationship that he wishes to establish between functions and sensory phenomena (see Stumpf 1906a). Yet, this debate on emotions and sense-feelings shows clearly that, for Stumpf, the full recognition of the potential of the field of phenomenology as a whole goes hand in hand with the denunciation of what Stumpf considers to be the dogmas of Brentano’s empiricism. Yet, Brentano’s program without its dogmas remains viable not only for Stumpf but also for most of his students. This is true a fortiori of the author of *Logical Investigations*, who adopted a position on emotions and sense-feelings that is very similar to Stumpf’s (see 1928, 104). In his fifth investigation, Husserl distinguishes intentional experiences or acts from non-intentional consciousness and argues that pleasure and pain belong to phenomenal experiences just as the visual and tactile sensations; emotions, on the other hand, fall under the category of intentional acts as in Brentano and Stumpf (Husserl 1901, 401 ff). This is not to say that we should favor the Husserl-Stumpf position over Brentano’s, even though it occupies an important place in actual philosophical discussions on emotions (see Reisenzein, R. & Schönpfug, W. 1992).
The real challenge to the theories of affects of the Brentano school came from two supporters of Wundt’s psychology, namely, the American psychologist E. B. Titchener and the French psychologist T. Ribot, whom Stumpf discussed in his “Apology” (Stumpf, 1928, 113 ff). The debate on emotions is not entirely foreign to the controversy that opposed Wundt and Stumpf in the 1880s regarding the reliability of Wundt’s experimental results on sounds distances (see Boring 1929), for in the criticism of Stumpf by Titchener and especially Ribot, we can see a kind of response to the no less stringent objections that Stumpf made against Wundt and his students. Thus, in his book published in 1910 under the title Problème de psychologie affective, Ribot briefly discusses Stumpf’s theory of affects and blames him for using old-fashioned scholastic procedures:

“I will not continue to discuss an opinion rejected by the majority of contemporary psychologists. It is remnant of an intellectualist method, used for so long and so exclusively in the study of sentiment, which sometimes degenerates into a scholastic exercise, because it essentially focuses on a rather pointless problem of classification instead of on the very nature of pleasure and pain.” (Ribot 1910, 131)

In a footnote to his book Systematic Psychology (1929, 256-57), Titchener quotes another passage by Ribot in a review of Titchener’s book Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of Thought Processes, in which Ribot blames Titchener once again for paying too much attention to a doubtful theory that is based on “verbal analyses, ideology, subtleties, and scholastics distinctions” (Ribot, 1910b, 650.) and which, after all, has no interest for psychologists. Titchener acquiesces to Ribot’s remarks and mentions Wundt’s paper “Psychologismus und Logicismus” published the same year, in which he criticizes precisely Husserl and the Brentanians for essentially the same reasons (Wundt 1910, 519). Yet, adds Titchener (1929, 257), Wundt’s paper “amply justifies Ribot’s reproaches.” Considering Stumpf’s response to Titchener’s objections in “Apology” (Stumpf 1928, 113 ff), a response to Ribot would proceed along the following lines: True, descriptive psychology, as a philosophical discipline, remains empty without the contribution of physiological and experimental psychology; however, we must also recognize with the Brentanians and many philosophers that experimentation without descriptive analyses is doomed to blindness.

Summary
This paper studies the controversy between Franz Brentano and his student Carl Stumpf regarding emotions and sense-feelings. The issue is whether the pleasure provided by an object such as a work of art is intentional, as in Brentano’s theory, in which it is closely related to the class of emotions (love and hate), or merely phenomenal, as Stumpf would have it. The paper is divided into two parts: I first examine several aspects of the relationship between Stumpf and Brentano; I then evaluate whether Stumpf’s deviation from several theses of Brentano’s descriptive psychology, namely that on emotions and
sense-feelings, challenges his commitment to Brentano’s program in philosophy.

Keywords: Stumpf, Brentano, emotions, sense-feelings, Lotze.

Zusammenfassung
Der vorliegende Beitrag behandelt die Kontroverse zwischen Franz Brentano und seinem Schüler Carl Stumpf in Bezug auf Gefühle und Sinneswahrnehmungen. Es geht um die Frage, ob Freude, die durch ein Objekt von außen, etwa ein Kunstwerk hervorgerufen wird, bewusst ist, wie es Brentanos Theorie nahelegt, in der sie eng mit Gefühlen (Liebe und Hass) verwandt ist, oder ob sie rein phänomenal ist, wie Stumpf behauptet. Der Beitrag ist in zwei Teile gegliedert: der Autor untersucht zuerst einige Aspekte der Beziehung zwischen Stumpf und Brentano und schätzt dann Stumpf’s Abweichungen von einigen Thesen in Brentanos deskriptiver Psychologie, besonders in Hinblick auf Gefühle und Sinneswahrnehmungen, dahingehend ein, ob diese Differenzen Stumpf’s Bekenntnis zu Brentanos philosophischem Programm in Frage stellen.

Schlüsselwörter: Stumpf, Brentano, Gefühle, Sinneswahrnehmung, Lotze.

References
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